One thing I did not like about the book was chapter 4 (gender) which felt like postmodern gender ideology / trans ideology was being forced in there. There are numerous issues with this IMO.
For one: the (deliberate?*) coopting of language to serve an ideological agenda.
* I donât mean GWS (the author) is doing this deliberately, but that gender activists (including academics) might be doing it deliberately.
The word âgenderâ was literally synonymous with âsexâ until the 60s or so. Websterâs 1913 has â2. Sex, male or female. [Obs. or Colloq.]â (and similar in Websterâs 1828).
From my own research, it seems like sex is a slightly older word than gender (late 14c. vs early 15c.) for referring to male/female. (âGenderâ meaning type predates both to about 13c. according to the linked source)
âSexâ was the main word for male/female until the (late?) 1800s when it also began being used to mean intercourse which explains why gender became the more common term.
Iâm opposed to the coopting of the word âgenderâ to mean something new and different. Typically it seemed like we used noun phrases to be specific when we wanted to talk about something gender related that wasnât gender itself (e.g., gender roles, gender identity, etc).
Contemporarily, it seems like âgenderâ is now used interchangeably and ambiguously to refer to something like gender identity but less restrictive and amorphous.
I think one can demonstrate this issue by considering all uses of âgenderâ in a work like BFITF and replacing every instance with something more specific: âbiological sexâ for male/female, and âgender rolesâ or âgender identityâ for the other instances. My prediction is that this will show inconsistencies in BFITF (and other TRA* content) including âbait and switchâ type tactics where someone starts by referring to biological sex and then switches to a different meaning.
* TRA = Trans Rights Activists; I maybe use it too generally to mean any new-gender ideologues
Personally I separate (in my head) usages of gender into the traditional definition and âgenfeeliaâ* (a word I made up to mean âhow one feels about ones genderâ), and so it makes it quite obvious when this kind of bait and switch happens.
* One argument against âgenfeeliaâ is that itâs perjorative, which I donât think is true, but I can see how some trans people might see it that way because theyâd see it as reducing something fundamental about themselves to simply ideas in their head (which is what it is, but they want it to be more than that). GWSâs argument actually supports this to some degree with the points about similarities in brain size.
I canât remember anywhere that BFITF swaps out âsexâ for genfeelia, but thatâs a common thing that happens with TRAs, e.g., âsex assigned at birthâ. Sex is not âassignedâ (except maybe in very rare intersex cases, but AFAIK most intersex cases arenât that ambiguous and the body is still dominantly organized around one kind of gamete even if there are some developmental anomalies). Gender-as-genfeelia can be assigned, but talking about it like that makes it very obvious that weâre talking about a psychological thing not physiological.
(Note: in my notes I refer to the author as GWS rather than Stone. I can change if itâs problematic but I donât think it is.)
GWS also doesnât address the conflict with TERFs, who are usually gender critical* as far as I understand. TERFs donât like patriarchy but reject the idea that you can switch gender however you like. (TERFs are feminists like JK Rowling and possibly best known for opposing men being allowed in womenâs bathrooms and changing rooms.)
* Gender critical is the main school of thought opposing trans ideology from logical, physiological, psychological, and philosophical bases.
The fact this conflict exists is a strong argument against including #1 in the list, IMO.
- Humans have two genders, âmenâ and âwomenâ.
While this does seem to be a foundational idea of patriarchy, so are lots of ideas about family and sexual reproduction and the like. It seems like the list is meant to be the smallest set of controversial ideas which is why lots of other foundational ideas of patriarchy arenât included (because those ideas are shared with feminism and other -isms etc more broadly).
I think #2 is problematic also:
- We can reliably tell men from women by their biological, psychological, and social traits.
Yes, of course, because âmanâ and âwomanâ describe biological sex. It is typically trivial to infer which gamete type a personâs body is organized around.
This only makes sense as a point if #2 does not consider biological sex, but rather considers genfeelia, gender roles, and gender self-identification. This is a sneaky bait and switch. If it were put more correctly, then its nature would be more obvious, e.g., we can reliably tell how someone feels about their gendered expressions by their biological, psychological, and social traits.
I have more thoughts on all this but will need to write them up later. Also I realize Iâve mostly talked about the points in ch3 instead of ch4, but ch4 depends on all this pretext.