https://www.elliottemple.com/essays/reading#karl-popper
So, am I right that you think I said or implied that you don’t exist, and that that was what dropped the context?
I think 1, 2, and 4 mean the same thing. Or at least I think in most contexts 4 is implied when you state 1.
But, for my concept of certainty, 3 doesn’t mean the same thing as the others at all, and it is never implied by them.
You seem to be saying that your concept of truth and certainty are same concept? That they are synonymous. That makes some things make more sense. I think I sensed this earlier:
So what if translate what you said here:
to this:
- I can’t see the reason to not acknowledge some things as being true.
Do those two sentences mean the same thing to you?
Yes. Why have the distinction?
I think so. I will give an example just to make sure and be clear.
The amount of possible chess positions is uncertain. Therefore, I am certain that I do not know all the chess positions.
Are either of these sentences objectionable?
This is how I first discovered both you and Popper. Believing that truth is objective is the great appeal of both, I would say. I like Popper’s methods for criticizing but not for creating. I think Newton, Darwin and others arrived at their conclusions using induction. Their conclusions were built up from particulars into general truths, not broken down using deduction.
Well I think truth is the commonsense concept of a statement’s correspondence with reality. Statement X is true if and only if X is the case in reality. This is an objective relationship.
And I think certainty is a kind of assurance that something is true. It’s a type of positive argument that statement X is true. It’s a kind of positive proof that X is true.
The alternative to being certain that X is true is to just conjecture that X is true. Popper says this works just fine and that we don’t need certain foundations to build on. We can just conjecture things.
CR says that certainty is not attainable and that its pursuit is vain. And it says all our knowledge is conjectural.
What I said before might also help clarify the distinction:
Do you see two different concepts here?
CR says induction is logically impossible, and that therefore neither Newton, Darwin, nor anyone could have arrived at any conclusion using induction.
What do you think of the problems with induction Elliot talks about in the topic article? Do you think they’ve been adequately answered somewhere?
My favorite definition of certainty is that you have a guarantee that you haven’t made a mistake. That you know you couldn’t possibly have made a mistake.
I think we have the same idea, this is just how I like to think about it.
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I wasn’t approximating. I meant literally always.
Yes.
No. That’s the misinterpretation I was talking about.
How do I square those two? I was thinking of “we always make mistakes” as meaning “there are always mistakes present.” I didn’t mean “everything we do is a mistake,” but that every time we do anything we make a mistake somewhere at some level.
I’m not fully convinced myself whether this is true but I was talking about what Elliot thinks. And he thinks we can have infinite progress:
We make progress by correcting errors, so we can’t have infinite progress if there aren’t always errors present to correct.
I can see this working with saying that infinite precision is impossible. We don’t need infinite precision for any one goal we have. Thus when we do anything we can succeed at our goals but still have mistakes pertaining to other goals. Which means that everything we do is not a mistake at the same time that anything we do contains mistakes.
So: do one thing → can be success wrt some goals, but there will always be mistakes wrt other goals which we can improve on. And I think “always” is used correctly because it applies to all actions and knowledge we create.
I understand that this is what it says. I say that I am certain that A is A. I am also certain that deduction depends on the law of identity.
I think that his definition of induction here is incorrect. Induction is reasoning from the particular to the general. Darwin noticed many particulars that followed a pattern and induced the theory of natural selection. From observations, he inferred general principles. From these general principles he inferred specific consequences through deduction. Both creation and criticism was applied by Darwin using both induction and deduction.
I guess this is my problem with CR and rationalism in general, it lacks integration with empiricism. We need both. Same with induction and deduction. Without integration our understanding cannot be enough. CR is great for criticizing but thinking and understanding takes more than criticism.
Evidence that I am writing gives support to the certainty that I am conscious and living. Consciousness makes no sense if there is nothing to be conscious of so this fact supports the certainty that existence exists. It seems unreasonable to deny certainty of some things just because we are fallible. It is impossible that existence doesn’t exist. It is impossible that a thing is not itself. It is impossible that I didn’t just use the word “impossible” several times. Certainty here is rational. Uncertainty of these facts is irrational avoidance.
I know that this will not be satisfying to proponents (if I can even say that) of CR. I believe I have made myself clear enough, anyway. I look forward to discussing more specific issues in the future with you all.
This gets into the general issue that there are hundreds of versions of induction that people advocate. The claims made vary quite a bit. Many contradict each other. Many are vague about some issues such as induction’s role in explaining intelligence or its role downstream of intelligence. So it’s difficult to write an essay that discusses induction in a way that works well for most inductivists.
Has anyone written a clear, comprehensive, detailed, complete version of induction that you think is correct? I’d be particularly interested if it also showed a correct understanding of some of Popper’s criticisms and answered them.
I’m not sure which definition you’re using and if it’s the same for each sentence.
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On the one hand, CR says
, but on the other hand one can be certain about something being itself. A is A.
My general questions are: what does CR mean by certainty? Why say certainty is not attainable and its pursuit is vain? Is there something impossible about it? Can one not be certain that A is A?
What about the certainty of other statements? Like if one could be certain about A being A why not be certain about a statement like, “People use blankets?” I’m certain people use blankets even though there are people who probably don’t that doesn’t make me doubt that others use blankets. I don’t see anything wrong with, “People use blankets.” What does certainty mean here according to CR?
If CR means certainty by making sure something is not wrong in all cases where it does or doesnt happen then I don’t think I need certainty. All I care about is that a lot of people use blankets. Like in millions. Am I or am I not wrong in saying, “people use blankets?”
What does A is A mean btw? That an object or idea equals itself?
Contrast with subjectivism or mysticism where things don’t have firm identities. Where things can be two contradictory things at the same time.
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Yeah I would happily use guarantee in the place of assurance.
But you’re using the term ‘certain’ to refer to a different concept to what CR means. And you didn’t see the distinction between that concept and the concept of truth. So I don’t think you understand what CR means by that claim.
My point was to help you understand the distinction between two concepts. I don’t know if you do or don’t see the difference between the two concepts I outlined.
I don’t think Elliot is offering a definition of induction there. I think he is describing an aspect of it that is relevant in to the sub topics of the essay. Anything can be correctly described in many ways so long as they aren’t logically inconsistent with each other. (A rock may be a rock and also a piece of granite and a collection of atoms and a pet and a birthday present and a weapon, etc, etc.)
Regarding induction, it seems to me that you and Elliot actually are talking about substantially the same thing:
I think getting clear on what you mean by certainty, and what CR means by certainty, and not mixing those concepts up when trying to understand CR is really important for clearing the way to talking about these issues. For example you say:
It seems unreasonable to deny certainty of some things just because we are fallible.
CR and Elliot agree with this! If by certainty you mean ‘the truth’, then yes, CR agrees that it’s unreasonable to deny the truth of something just because we are fallible. That we are fallible is not a criticism of an idea.
It’s the “no mistakes” I care the most about. Not important though.
Do you use Peikoff’s definition of certainty? Do you agree with everything in this quote?
“Certain” represents an assessment of the evidence for a conclusion; it is usually contrasted with two other broad types of assessment: “possible” and “probable.” . . .
Idea X is “certain” if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative . . . .
You cannot challenge a claim to certainty by means of an arbitrary declaration of a counter-possibility, . . . you cannot manufacture possibilities without evidence . . . .
All the main attacks on certainty depend on evading its contextual character . . . .
The alternative is not to feign omniscience, erecting every discovery into an out-of-context absolute, or to embrace skepticism and claim that knowledge is impossible. Both these policies accept omniscience as the standard: the dogmatists pretend to have it, the skeptics bemoan their lack of it. The rational policy is to discard the very notion of omniscience. Knowledge is contextual—it is knowledge, it is valid, contextually.
I’m not sure exactly where to point you I’m sorry. I believe I got this idea from Popper though. I think reading Elliot’s top few recommended Popper things could help? I’ll keep it in mind in case I find it at some point.
As for your other points, I intend to get back to you on those btw!
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Not that I know of. I think it would be a good project for me to begin on, though. But, I don’t think there is anything that I or anyone else could argue that would give you or any other CR proponent absolute certainty that things will maintain their identities. The question is “is it reasonable to think that A will always be A?” Indeed, that will be impossible if there is no acknowledgment from CR that “A is A” just to begin with. Without an axiom it becomes circular and I’m not sure where to start. Just the concept of falsifiability seems to be unfalsifiable. But that would contradict itself. So, asking me to show how induction is correct is like me asking you to show how “falsifiability” can be falsified. I am not sure of the way to proceed from here, or even if there is a way.
Explaining what you mean by maintaining identity over time is one of the things your explanation of induction should do.
A rock may later be sand. Things change. This isn’t meant to contradict you, merely to illustrate that some explanation of what you mean is required.
CR has never denied that A is A as a matter of symbolic logic. Whether it disagrees with you about identity and change or not would depend on what claims you make about those topics. It’s hard for me to comment further due to the lack of any text explaining claims that I could engage with.
I would say that there are some nuances between statements 1-4. It seems to me each one has a different meaning than the one before it. The differences between any given statements might be pretty small, but they exist, and in some specific comparisons they might be bigger. To me, 3 in particular stands out.
I think Elliot explains himself in a lower comment, but just in my own words:
I think Elliot was referring to the definition of certainty in the linguistic sense. You replied by talking about degrees of certainty, but I think that’s actually jumping ahead. Before we get into degrees of certainty, it’s worthwhile to make sure everyone has the same understanding of what is meant by “certainty.”
I agree with the idea that whether or not we have certainty depends, first, on how we define “certainty.”
For example:
If we defined “certainty” as “milk” then we could definitely have certainty because I have milk in my fridge right now.
If we defined “certainty” as something like “the idea that something is true as far as we can tell, pending any big discoveries we might make in the future that change the context” then I think I could have certainty about a lot of stuff.
But if we defined “certainty” as “Established as a truth or fact to be absolutely received, depended, or relied upon; not to be doubted, disputed, or called in question; indubitable, sure.” then I don’t think I have much certainty of anything at all. That definition of “certainty” seems to be at odds with the idea that we are fallible.
If it helps, it might be useful to consider that the CF community has some specialized jargon associated with it. I have noticed that words mean specific things here. I think some folks here would disagree with me that their understanding of “certainty” is jargon, since it maps pretty cleanly onto most standard dictionary definitions. Still, I think conceptualizing it as jargon might help… there are plenty of examples where jargon does still map quite well to dictionary definitions, but it’s still a type of jargon because it has a precisely defined meaning that is important to other related concepts.
So when you use the word “certainty” folks are going to challenge that choice of words in particular, since they think it is an epistemological mistake. And you inadvertently open up the discussion to a potentially cascading series of sub-disagreements that you may not have intended, and may not be interested in.