Is Deciding To Adopt A Rational Attitude Irrational? Is It An Irrational Faith in Reason?

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Have any of you folks read the chapter in The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume II By Karl Popper titled “Oracular Philosophy and the Revolt Against Reason”?

If so, can you critique whether I understand what he’s saying here.

On page 218 he writes:

“We have to conclude from this that the rationalist attitude cannot possibly be based upon argument or experience, and that a comprehensive rationalism is untenable.
But this means that whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because without reasoning he has adopted some decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called irrational. Whatever it may be, we can describe it as an irrational faith in reason. Rationalism is therefore far from comprehensive or self-contained.”(The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume II, p. 218)

I imagined an example to try to refute his claim that you can’t adopt the rationalist attitude rationally. Let’s imagine Tom wants to persuade Jerry into having a rationalist attitude because it’s effective in solving all kinds of problems in reality. Jerry asks Tom to show him how it’s effective. Tom gives examples and persuades Jerry to become a rationalist. Didn’t Jerry adopt a rationalist attitude rationally?

Well, no.

When Tom persuades Jerry that rationalism is effective, what standards is Jerry using to evaluate Tom’s persuasion? If Jerry is using rational standards to judge the evidence and arguments Tom presents, then Jerry was already operating with some commitment to rationalism before the conversation began. But if Jerry isn’t using rational standards, then his acceptance of Tom’s case would itself be non-rational.

Further down on the same page he writes:

“For there are other tenable attitudes, notably that of critical rationalism, which recognizes that the fundamental rationalist attitude is based upon an irrational decision, or upon faith in reason. Accordingly, the choice is entirely open. We are free to choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an irrational decision, and in so far, a certain priority of irrationalism.”
(The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume II, p. 218)

So Popper means that logically speaking, the non-rational choice comes first, and rational inquiry flows from that initial commitment. The choice to be rational is itself not rationally compelled.

Critical rationalism is a special type of approach that acknowledges the rationalist attitude is based on an irrational choice. But, it’s different from irrationalism because after that initial choice, critical rationalism subjects everything else - including its own methods - to criticism and testing.

I’d appreciate any feedback or criticisms.

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What edition is yours? My quotes from the fifth edition didn’t exactly match yours.

Mine are:

We have to conclude from this that no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude. Thus a comprehensive rationalism is untenable.

But this means that whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be called ‘irrational’. Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational faith in reason. So rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained.

and:

For there are other tenable attitudes, notably that of critical rationalism which recognizes the fact that the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith—from faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism).

I haven’t read the chapter, but I would like to to comment here.

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Mine is from the original, first edition.

Is yours from the first single-volume Princeton University Press printing, 2013? I have that Ebook and your quotes match those ones exactly.

I did some research and it looks like Popper’s Fifth Edition is considered definitive, so let’s use your quotes. It doesn’t change my analysis of Popper’s main point.

Ok, sounds good.

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I read it long ago. I don’t agree with Popper about needing a sort of irrational faith in reason but your reading of the quotes looks OK.

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I had problems with it too at first. The word “faith” seemed especially problematic. But, based on how Popper defines rationalism and reason in the chapter, and looking up secular definitions of faith, I can’t think of an argument that doesn’t either lead to a circularity problem or push the problem back a level. How do you get around this?

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A rationalist attitude/premises/foundation/whatever is open to criticism, error correction and reconsideration. It is compatible with and enables its own error correction, so it’s rational (by definition). So it’s not held as a matter of irrational faith or arbitrary decision.

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That’s similar to one of the arguments I thought of. Critical rationalism is rational . Critical rationalism’s practice is rational. Popper seems to agree with this. But he argues the initial choice to value criticism over, say, dogmatism, is non-rational. How would you convince an Irrationalist, who rejects rational argument, to start practicing critical rationalism? Doesn’t that first step to adopt it assume a preference (if only tentative) for reason, making it a non-rational move, even if the practice itself is rational?

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I don’t think I’ve ever met a real irrationalist to debate with. I don’t know why persuading one of them would be a major concern. And what I commented on was what’s rational not what’s persuasive to irrationalists. If I did meet one and want to persuade them, I would expect some parochial details to be important to the process; I think I’d have to pay attention to them and think creatively instead of relying fully on a generic known-in-advance debate playbook.

Whether a first step is rational depends on what the definition of “rational” is, not on what ideas you have already adopted at the time you do the step. You seem to be maybe also assuming that the irrationalist denies being an irrationalist and is trying to redefine multiple words, which is not what I would expect. How to deal with people who disagree with the dictionary and want to do major rewrites of word definitions is a separate matter than how to deal with irrationalists, and also is not an issue you should expect to run into much.

The whole first step or foundations thing is confused in general. People often start in the middle, as Popper himself has talked about elsewhere.

What to “value” is yet another issue that is different than what fits the definitional criteria for “rational”. You don’t have to value rationality to determine what is and isn’t rational.

See also Morality without Foundations

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They may not label themselves irrationalists, but I’m guessing you’ve argued with mystic types, at least. I certainly have.

It may seem irrelevant, but Popper spends pages in this chapter talking about the history of rationalism vs. irrationalism, starting in Ancient Greece. It helps paint the picture and eventually ties into his main point. That adopting critical rationalism requires choosing to value criticism and reason- a choice that can’t be made through reason alone if someone rejects rational persuasion. He gives the liar paradox as an example.

Yeah, I think Popper agreed with this. But that’s the thing, the definition might classify the step as rational, but actually taking that step requires already valuing the rational approach over alternatives.

The foundations thing isn’t about needing secure starting points for knowledge; it’s about the unavoidable non-rational element in adopting the critical attitude itself, whether that happens at the beginning or in the middle of inquiry.

Yeah, defining rationality is separate from valuing it, but that’s Popper’s point. The gap between descriptive classification (‘this counts as rational’) and valuation (‘I should do rational things’) can’t be bridged by reason alone if someone doesn’t value it.

To engage in critical rationalism, I think you do have to value it (at least tentatively). And that valuation can’t itself be rationally grounded without circularity.

That’s why Popper says:

“For there are other tenable attitudes, notably that of critical rationalism which recognizes the fact that the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith—from faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism).”

I found the chapter cool because it shows how people take for granted how we came to value reason.

I’ve read your “Morality without Foundations” a few times. It’s so good!

Based on your responses I’m not sure you disagree with Popper…

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People don’t make a decision to be rational or irrational and then follow it through to its logical conclusion. They make many separate decisions, at many different levels of abstraction, fundamentalness, parochialness, etc, and some of their decisions are contradictory. Most of their decisions about ideas are artificially limited in scope or reach, not extended as much as they logically could be.

Lots of it isn’t even decisions in the usual sense: it’s just picking up culture in childhood, before age 10, when one’s understanding of what it means is lacking. A ton of it is before age 5.

I’ve never found anyone who doesn’t make some sort of attempt to make rational arguments. Even if they advocate theism, relativism, solipsism or something, my experience is people try to give reasons and use reason some, even if I think they’re bad at it. They partially do value reason. I’m not aware of anything like a consistent irrationalist, consistent mystic, etc.

I think the issue is how to get people to explore and grow the more rational parts of themselves that already exist, and to incrementally deemphasize and move away from some other stuff, not how to get them to make some initial or fundamental decision in favor of reason. This applies to everyone including me: none of us are perfectly rational but we’re all already partially rational. (Maybe it doesn’t apply before 1 month old, or 1 year old, or something. I don’t know how that boundary may work or where it is. I don’t think those details are very important to the situation for dealing with people age 10+.)

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Agreed.

Yeah, that sounds possible. I wish we knew more. To be fair, I think this is compatible with Popper’s take.

If you’re curious, this was Popper’s description of the irrationalist attitude:

“The irrationalist attitude may be developed along the following lines. Though perhaps recognizing reason and scientific argument as tools that may do well enough if we wish to scratch the surface of things, or as means to serve some irrational end, the irrationalist will insist that ‘human nature’ is in the main not rational. Man, he holds, is more than a rational animal, and also less. In order to see that he is less, we need only consider how small is the number of men who are capable of argument; this is why, according to the irrationalist, the majority of men will always have to be tackled by an appeal to their emotions and passions rather than by an appeal to their reason. But man is also more than just a rational animal, since all that really matters in his life goes beyond reason. Even the few scientists who take reason and science seriously are bound to their rationalist attitude merely because they love it. Thus even in these rare cases, it is the emotional make-up of man and not his reason that determines his attitude. Moreover, it is his intuition, his mystical insight into the nature of things, rather than his reasoning which makes a great scientist. Thus rationalism cannot offer an adequate interpretation even of the apparently rational activity of the scientist. But since the scientific field is exceptionally favourable to a rationalist interpretation, we must expect that rationalism will fail even more conspicuously when it tries to deal with other fields of human activity. And this expectation, so the irrationalist will continue his argument, proves to be quite accurate. Leaving aside the lower aspects of human nature, we may look to one of its highest, to the fact that man can be creative. It is the small creative minority of men who really matter; the men who create works of art or of thought, the founders of religions, and the great statesmen. These few exceptional individuals allow us to glimpse the real greatness of man. But although these leaders of mankind know how to make use of reason for their purposes, they are never men of reason. Their roots lie deeper—deep in their instincts and impulses, and in those of the society of which they are parts. Creativeness is an entirely irrational, a mystical faculty …”
(The Open Society and Its Enemies)

Agreed.