This paper argues that the rationality of believing X should be determined by the utility of believing X, not by the amount of evidential support for X.
This sounds anti-truth. The paper tries to answer that objection:
A putative advantage of this evidentialist view is its ability to explain why we ordinarily take truth-conduciveness to be important to the rationality of belief. But Equal Treatment [the name of the view the paper advocates] can explain this equally well, as we generally do better to believe the truth.
Sure we generally do better to believe the truth, as some sort of broad trend. But that’s an awful response. It grants that, in some cases, the paper is advocating utility over truth.
I think the paper is advocating, on purpose, believing false things sometimes to gain utility. It doesn’t go into details like that those could be conformist beliefs or social manipulations.
BTW one can argue that true beliefs always have higher (expected or average) utility. But most people don’t believe that, including this author. (If they believed it, they would have said “always” instead of “generally”. And it’d undermine the point of the paper, which is to present a better alternative, not to present something equivalent.)